BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20210314T030000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20201101T010000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20210226T212707Z UID:F69F754E-1DBC-4C8A-BB84-204E8CDAE30A DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20210226T123000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20210226T133000 DESCRIPTION:We face an existential threat of permanent damage to critical p hysical components in our national infrastructure as a result of their poo r resilience against cybersecurity attack. A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) commonly provides the control system for such components\, e.g.\, b ulk power generators. Our proof-of-concept implementation dramatically mit igates threats to such cyber-physical systems (CPS) by specifically levera ging what NIST 800-160 calls “highly assured\, kernel-based operating sy stems in Programmable Logic Controllers”.\n\nWe dramatically reduce the attack surface visible to potential attackers to be ~1% of the total compa red to competing approaches. Our demonstration refactors the common CPS ar chitectural approach to data and cooperating processes into hierarchically ordered security domains using the widely available OpenPLC project code base. The GEMSOS security kernel verifiably enforces traditional integrity mandatory access control (MAC) policy on all cross-domain flows. GEMSOS i s designed for wide-spread delivery as a Reusable Trusted Device\, providi ng the reference monitor for secure single-board\, multi-board\, and Syste m-on-a-Chip systems.\n\nOnly a processing component in the highest integri ty domain can directly send/receive control signals\, enforcing “safe re gion” operating constraints to prevent physical damage. This very small attack surface protects the critical physical components\, making the over all CPS resilient to skilled adversaries’ attacks\, even though much lar ger lower integrity software running in other domains on the same Trusted Device hardware and network infrastructure may be thoroughly compromised. We make available our restructured OpenPLC source to encourage control sys tem manufacturers to deliver verifiable PLC products to\, as NIST puts it\ , “achieve a high degree of system integrity and availability” for con trol systems. UC Davis is using our demonstration on GEMSOS in their Compu ter Security Lab\, today.\n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/258 933 LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/258933 ORGANIZER:bo.yuan@rit.edu SEQUENCE:2 SUMMARY:Dramatically Reducing Attack Surface Using Integrity MAC Security K ernel for Programmable Logic Controllers URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/258933 X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p>We face an existential threat of permanent damage to critical physical components in our national infrastructure as a result of their poor resilience against cybersecurity attack. A Programm able Logic Controller (PLC) commonly provides the control system for such components\, e.g.\, bulk power generators. Our proof-of-concept implementa tion dramatically mitigates threats to such cyber-physical systems (CPS) b y specifically leveraging what NIST 800-160 calls &ldquo\;<em>highly assur ed\, kernel-based operating systems in Programmable Logic Controllers</em> &rdquo\;.<br /> <br /> We dramatically reduce the attack surface visible t o potential attackers to be ~1% of the total compared to competing approac hes. Our demonstration refactors the common CPS architectural approach to data and cooperating processes into hierarchically ordered security domain s using the widely available OpenPLC project code base. The GEMSOS securit y kernel verifiably enforces traditional integrity mandatory access contro l (MAC) policy on all cross-domain flows. GEMSOS is designed for wide-spre ad delivery as a Reusable Trusted Device\, providing the reference monitor for secure single-board\, multi-board\, and System-on-a-Chip systems.<br /> <br /> Only a processing component in the highest integrity domain can directly send/receive control signals\, enforcing &ldquo\;safe region&rdqu o\; operating constraints to prevent physical damage. This very small atta ck surface protects the critical physical components\, making the overall CPS resilient to skilled adversaries&rsquo\; attacks\, even though much la rger lower integrity software running in other domains on the same Trusted Device hardware and network infrastructure may be thoroughly compromised. We make available our restructured OpenPLC source to encourage control sy stem manufacturers to deliver verifiable PLC products to\, as NIST puts it \, &ldquo\;<em>achieve a high degree of system integrity and availability< /em>&rdquo\; for control systems. UC Davis is using our demonstration on G EMSOS in their Computer Security Lab\, today.</p> END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR