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DESCRIPTION:Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) have become the mainstrea
 m in the development of automobile industry. Many emerging technologies ha
 ve been proposed to provide users with comfortable and convenient driving 
 experience. Note that some of the communication interfaces are vulnerable 
 and can be easily attacked. Although many malicious attacks can be carried
  out in various ways\, their final step must be in the in-vehicle network\
 , i.e.\, the controller area network (CAN) bus. In order to protect the se
 curity of CAN bus\, it is of great importance to design an intrusion detec
 tion system (IDS) which can monitor the message transmission in real time.
  There are various defense mechanisms that have been proposed\, but they c
 annot meet the high security requirements of safety-critical ECUs against 
 in-vehicle network attacks. In this talk\, we propose three vehicle IDS so
 lutions from the perspective of side channel analysis\, based on the uniqu
 e voltage characteristics of each ECU\, the clock skew of each ECU\, and t
 he correlation among data frames in CAN bus. They neither occupy the bandw
 idth and computing resources of CAN bus\, nor need to modify the original 
 CAN protocol. They can not only accurately detect malicious attacks\, but 
 also identify the attack source with high precision\, thus realizing timel
 y discovery and isolation of vehicle attacks.\n\nSpeaker(s): Jiajia Liu\, 
 \n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/310317
LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/310317
ORGANIZER:cai@ece.uvic.ca
SEQUENCE:3
SUMMARY:Side Channel Analysis: A New Perspective for Vehicle Intrusion Dete
 ction System
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/310317
X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p>Intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) have
  become the mainstream in the development of automobile industry. Many eme
 rging technologies have been proposed to provide users with comfortable an
 d convenient driving experience. Note that some of the communication inter
 faces are vulnerable and can be easily attacked. Although many malicious a
 ttacks can be carried out in various ways\, their final step must be in th
 e in-vehicle network\, i.e.\, the controller area network (CAN) bus. In or
 der to protect the security of CAN bus\, it is of great importance to desi
 gn an intrusion detection system (IDS) which can monitor the message trans
 mission in real time. There are various defense mechanisms that have been 
 proposed\, but they cannot meet the high security requirements of safety-c
 ritical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks. In this talk\, we propose
  three vehicle IDS solutions from the perspective of side channel analysis
 \, based on the unique voltage characteristics of each ECU\, the clock ske
 w of each ECU\, and the correlation among data frames in CAN bus. They nei
 ther occupy the bandwidth and computing resources of CAN bus\, nor need to
  modify the original CAN protocol. They can not only accurately detect mal
 icious attacks\, but also identify the attack source with high precision\,
  thus realizing timely discovery and isolation of vehicle attacks.</p>
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