BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20240310T030000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20231105T010000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20231221T175617Z UID:0E356283-0C89-423F-ABC8-C1E28657B01C DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231218T144500 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231218T163000 DESCRIPTION:We will examine the RowHammer problem in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)\, the first example of how a circuit-level failure mechanism can cause a practical and widespread system security vulnerability. RowHa mmer is the phenomenon that repeatedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM ch ip predictably causes bitflips in physically-adjacent rows. Building on ou r initial fundamental work that appeared at ISCA 2014\, Google Project Zer o demonstrated that this hardware phenomenon can be exploited by user-leve l programs to gain kernel privileges. Many other works demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHammer\, including remote takeover of a server vulne rable to RowHammer\, takeover of a mobile device by a malicious user-level application\, and destruction of predictive capabilities of commonly-used deep neural networks.\n\nUnfortunately\, the RowHammer problem still plag ues cutting-edge DRAM chips\, DDR4 and beyond. Based on our recent charact erization studies of more than 1500 DRAM chips from six technology generat ions that appeared at ISCA 2020 and MICRO 2021\, we show that RowHammer at the circuit level is getting much worse\, newer DRAM chips are much more vulnerable to RowHammer than older ones\, and existing mitigation techniqu es do not work well. We also show that existing proprietary mitigation tec hniques employed in DDR4 DRAM chips\, which are advertised to be Rowhammer -free\, can be bypassed via many-sided hammering (also known as TRRespass & Uncovering TRR).\n\nIn this talk\, we will provide an overview of RowHam mer research in academia and industry\, with a special focus on recent wor ks that rigorously analyze real chip characteristics and introduce promisi ng solution ideas. We will discuss the effect of RowHammer on High-Bandwid th Memory (HBM) chips and introduce and analyze RowPress\, which is a fund amentally different read disturbance phenomenon that also affects all DRAM chips. RowPress greatly (e.g.\, by 100X) reduces the activation count req uired to induce bitflips\, by keeping an activated row open for a long tim e. We will also discuss what other problems may be lurking in DRAM and oth er types of memory\, which can potentially threaten the foundations of rel iable and secure systems\, as memory technologies scale to higher densitie s. We will conclude by describing and advocating a principled approach to memory robustness (including reliability\, security\, safety) research tha t can enable us to better anticipate and prevent such vulnerabilities.\n\n A short accompanying paper\, which appeared at ASP-DAC 2023\, can be found here and serves as recommended reading:\n"Fundamentally Understanding and Solving RowHammer"\nhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2211.07613\n\nCo-sponsored by: IEEE North Jersey Section\n\nSpeaker(s): Onur Mutlu\n\nAgenda: \nEvent Tim e: 2:45 PM to 4:30 PM\n\nECE 202\, NJIT\, Newark\n\n3:45 PM to 3:00 PM Ref reshments and Networking\n\n3:00 PM to 4:30 PM Talk by Professor Onur Mutl u of ETH/Carnegie Mellon/Stanford\n\nSeminar is in ECEC 202. All Welcome: There is no fee/charge for attending IEEE technical seminar. You don't hav e to be an IEEE Member to attend. Refreshments are free for all attendees. Please invite your friends and colleagues to take advantage of this talk. \n\nRoom: 202\, Bldg: Electrical and Computer Engineering\, 154 Summit Str eet\, Newark\, NJ 07102\, NJIT\, Newark\, New Jersey\, United States\, 071 02 LOCATION:Room: 202\, Bldg: Electrical and Computer Engineering\, 154 Summit Street\, Newark\, NJ 07102\, NJIT\, Newark\, New Jersey\, United States\, 07102 ORGANIZER:dmisra@njit.edu SEQUENCE:59 SUMMARY:RowHammer\, RowPress and Beyond: Can We Be Free of Bitflips (Soon)? URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/390503 X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><div dir="auto">We will examine the RowHammer problem in Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)\, the first example of how a circuit-level failure mechanism can cause a practical and widespread sy stem security vulnerability.&nbsp\; RowHammer is the phenomenon that repea tedly accessing a row in a modern DRAM chip predictably causes bitflips in physically-adjacent rows. Building on our initial fundamental work that a ppeared at ISCA 2014\, Google Project Zero demonstrated that this hardware phenomenon can be exploited by user-level programs to gain kernel privile ges. Many other works demonstrated other attacks exploiting RowHammer\, in cluding remote takeover of a server vulnerable to RowHammer\, takeover of a mobile device by a malicious user-level application\, and destruction of predictive capabilities of commonly-used deep neural networks.</div>\n<di v dir="auto">&nbsp\;</div>\n<div dir="auto">Unfortunately\, the RowHammer problem still plagues cutting-edge DRAM chips\, DDR4 and beyond. Based on our recent characterization studies of more than 1500 DRAM chips from six technology generations that appeared at ISCA 2020 and MICRO 2021\, we show that RowHammer&nbsp\; at the circuit level is getting much worse\, newer DRAM chips are much more vulnerable to RowHammer than older ones\, and exi sting mitigation techniques do not work well. We also show that existing p roprietary mitigation techniques employed in DDR4 DRAM chips\, which are a dvertised to be Rowhammer-free\, can be bypassed via many-sided hammering (also known as TRRespass &amp\; Uncovering TRR).</div>\n<div dir="auto">&n bsp\;</div>\n<div dir="auto">In this talk\, we will provide an overview of RowHammer research in academia and industry\, with a special focus on rec ent works that rigorously analyze real chip characteristics and introduce promising solution ideas. We will discuss the effect of RowHammer on High- Bandwidth Memory (HBM) chips and introduce and analyze RowPress\, which is a fundamentally different read disturbance phenomenon that also affects a ll DRAM chips. RowPress greatly (e.g.\, by 100X) reduces the activation co unt required to induce bitflips\, by keeping an activated row open for a l ong time. We will also discuss what other problems may be lurking in DRAM and other types of memory\, which can potentially threaten the foundations of reliable and secure systems\, as memory technologies scale to higher d ensities. We will conclude by describing and advocating a principled appro ach to memory robustness (including reliability\, security\, safety) resea rch that can enable us to better anticipate and prevent such vulnerabiliti es.</div>\n<div dir="auto">&nbsp\;</div>\n<div dir="auto">A short accompan ying paper\, which appeared at ASP-DAC 2023\, can be found here and serves as recommended reading:</div>\n<div dir="auto">"Fundamentally Understandi ng and Solving RowHammer"</div>\n<div dir="auto"><a href="https://arxiv.or g/abs/2211.07613" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-saferedir ecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.07613&amp\ ;source=gmail&amp\;ust=1702521679697000&amp\;usg=AOvVaw3kbEUzgr7tOOw0G1nci b34">https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.<wbr />07613</a></div><br /><br />Agenda: <br /><p>Event Time: 2:45 PM to 4:30 PM</p>\n<p>ECE 202\, NJIT\, Newark</p >\n<p><span style="font-family: -apple-system\, BlinkMacSystemFont\, 'Sego e UI'\, Roboto\, Oxygen\, Ubuntu\, Cantarell\, 'Open Sans'\, 'Helvetica Ne ue'\, sans-serif\;">3:45 PM to 3:00 PM Refreshments and Networking</span>< /p>\n<p><span style="font-family: -apple-system\, BlinkMacSystemFont\, 'Se goe UI'\, Roboto\, Oxygen\, Ubuntu\, Cantarell\, 'Open Sans'\, 'Helvetica Neue'\, sans-serif\;">3:00 PM to 4:30 PM Talk by <strong>Professor Onur Mu tlu of ETH/Carnegie Mellon/Stanford</strong></span></p>\n<p><span style="f ont-family: -apple-system\, BlinkMacSystemFont\, 'Segoe UI'\, Roboto\, Oxy gen\, Ubuntu\, Cantarell\, 'Open Sans'\, 'Helvetica Neue'\, sans-serif\;"> Seminar is in ECEC 202. All Welcome: There is no fee/charge for attending IEEE technical seminar. You don't have to be an IEEE Member to attend. Ref reshments are free for all attendees. Please invite your friends and colle agues to take advantage of this talk.</span></p> END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR