BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20240310T030000
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:EDT
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20231105T010000
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11
TZNAME:EST
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20240122T205009Z
UID:DB94E718-02B9-449B-8688-7FFBDDF641D6
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240105T200000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240105T220000
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT:  Joseph discusses wireless security beginning with WW
 II enigma code interception and decryption methods along with the heros an
 d heroines who worked around the clock to save the allied nations. The col
 d war\, following WWII\, introduced additional risks and new challenges an
 d\, by example\, wireless security failures\, ease of wireless packet inte
 rcept\, and a list of encryption methods with inherent security and privac
 y defects. Finally\, wireless risks present in 2024 are shown as governmen
 t overreach\, aircraft security\, ship\, and drone electromagnetic interce
 ption. IMSI/IMSI- catchers are applied extensively a telephone eavesdroppi
 ng device used for intercepting mobile phone traffic and tracking location
  data of mobile phone users. A &quot;fake&quot; base station may be installed in a b
 uilding\, state police trunk\, or UAVs which target cell phones acquired\,
  tracked\, &amp; logged. This mapping and the service provider&#39;s real towers i
 s considered a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. However\, sophisticated at
 tacks may be able to downgrade 3G and LTE to non-LTE network services - wh
 ich do not require mutual authentication - and calls intercepted. State-of
 -the-art 5G Cellular security technology and the identified risks of base-
 station&#39;s dynamically changing to a weak 2/3G protocol\, hardware BTS troj
 ans\, and group cellids and location interception challenges are highlight
 ed.\n\nBIO:  Joseph Jesson\, is CEO of RFSigint Group\, a wireless sensor 
 platform IP and SOC supply-chain advisory company\, and currently consults
  with private corporations on wireless sensor networks (LPWAN narrowband d
 igital technology). Joe has 25+ years of experience in designing and imple
 menting - through production - IoT wireless sensors &amp; embedded systems and
  was awarded General Electric&#39;s Innovation prize\, the Edison Award\, in 2
 007. Joe was awarded over 15 patents\, published in the IEEE IoT Journal\,
  and engineered and tested wireless TEMPEST-shielded secure systems. Curre
 ntly IEEE Princeton LM LIFE Affinity Group Chair.\n\nQuestions? Contact: J
 oseph Jesson\, jejesson4@gmail.com\, 203-613-3344\n\nCo-sponsored by:  ACG
 NJ\n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/392267
LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/392267
ORGANIZER:jejesson4@gmail.com
SEQUENCE:24
SUMMARY:Wireless Security Risks - 1941 to 2024
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/392267
X-ALT-DESC:Description: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ABSTRACT:&amp;nbsp\;&lt;/strong&gt;&amp;nbsp\;Jo
 seph discusses wireless security beginning with WWII enigma code intercept
 ion and decryption methods along with the heros and heroines who worked ar
 ound the clock to save the allied nations. The cold war\, following WWII\,
  introduced additional risks and new challenges and\, by example\, wireles
 s security failures\, ease of wireless packet intercept\, and a list of en
 cryption methods with inherent security and privacy defects. Finally\, wir
 eless risks present in 2024 are shown as government overreach\, aircraft s
 ecurity\, ship\, and drone electromagnetic interception.&amp;nbsp\;IMSI/IMSI- 
 catchers&amp;nbsp\;are applied&amp;nbsp\;extensively&amp;nbsp\;&amp;nbsp\;a telephone eave
 sdropping device used for intercepting mobile phone traffic and tracking l
 ocation data of mobile phone users. A &quot;fake&quot; base station may be installed
  in a building\, state police&amp;nbsp\;trunk\, or UAVs which&amp;nbsp\; target ce
 ll phones acquired\, tracked\, &amp;amp\; logged. This mapping&amp;nbsp\; and the 
 service provider&#39;s real towers is considered a man-in-the-middle (MITM) at
 tack.&amp;nbsp\; However\, sophisticated attacks may be able to downgrade 3G a
 nd LTE to non-LTE network services - which do not require mutual authentic
 ation - and calls intercepted.&amp;nbsp\;&amp;nbsp\;State-of-the-art 5G Cellular s
 ecurity technology and the identified risks of base-station&#39;s dynamically 
 changing to a weak 2/3G protocol\, hardware BTS trojans\, and group cellid
 s and location interception challenges are highlighted.&amp;nbsp\;&lt;/p&gt;\n&lt;p&gt;&lt;st
 rong&gt;BIO:&amp;nbsp\;&lt;/strong&gt;&amp;nbsp\;Joseph Jesson\, is CEO of RFSigint Group\,
  a wireless sensor platform IP and SOC supply-chain advisory company\, and
  currently consults with private corporations on wireless sensor networks 
 (LPWAN narrowband digital technology). Joe has 25+ years of experience in 
 designing and implementing - through production - IoT wireless sensors &amp;am
 p\; embedded systems and was awarded General Electric&#39;s Innovation prize\,
  the Edison Award\, in 2007. Joe was awarded over 15 patents\, published i
 n the IEEE IoT Journal\, and engineered and tested wireless TEMPEST-shield
 ed secure systems. Currently IEEE Princeton LM LIFE Affinity Group Chair.&lt;
 /p&gt;\n&lt;p&gt;Questions?&amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\;Contact: Joseph Jesson\, jejesson4@gmail.
 com\, 203-613-3344&lt;/p&gt;
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR

