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DESCRIPTION:While capacity markets have been implemented in several regions
 \, many challenging questions remain in the design arena\, for instance:\n
 \n- What primary purposes should a capacity market serve?\n- How is a capa
 city market design compared to an energy-only design?\n- What is the capac
 ity demand in the absence of demand bids from market participants?\n- What
  quantity of capacity can a resource offer into the capacity market?\n- Ho
 w to define and measure the capacity obligation?\n- How to price the capac
 ity product when the market clearing problem is nonconvex?\n\nThis talk wi
 ll cover some of these capacity market design topics. Some existing design
 s will be used as examples to facilitate the discussion and demonstrate th
 e challenges.\n\nSpeaker(s): Feng Zhao \n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.
 ieee.org/m/460754
LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/460754
ORGANIZER:omid.alizadeh@ieee.org
SEQUENCE:85
SUMMARY:Challenges in Capacity Market Design
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/460754
X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p class="MsoNormal" style="mso-margin-top-al
 t: auto\; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto\;"><span style="font-family: Arial\,
  sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;">While capacity markets have been im
 plemented in several regions\, many challenging questions remain in the de
 sign arena\, for instance:</span></p>\n<ul>\n<li class="MsoNormal"><span s
 tyle="font-family: Arial\, sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;">What prim
 ary purposes should a capacity market serve? </span></li>\n<li class="MsoN
 ormal"><span style="font-family: Arial\, sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0
 )\;">How is a capacity market design compared to an energy-only design? </
 span></li>\n<li class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Arial\, sans-s
 erif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;">What is the capacity demand in the absence
  of demand bids from market participants? </span></li>\n<li class="MsoNorm
 al"><span style="font-family: Arial\, sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;
 ">What quantity of capacity can a resource offer into the capacity market?
  </span></li>\n<li class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: Arial\, san
 s-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;">How to define and measure the capacity 
 obligation? </span></li>\n<li class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: 
 Arial\, sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;">How to price the capacity pr
 oduct when the market clearing problem is nonconvex? </span></li>\n</ul>\n
 <p><span style="font-family: Arial\, sans-serif\; color: rgb(0\, 0\, 0)\;"
 >This talk will cover some of these capacity market design topics. Some ex
 isting designs will be used as examples to facilitate the discussion and d
 emonstrate the challenges.</span></p>
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