BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20250309T030000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20241103T010000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20250118T011242Z UID:16B30794-5EE1-4E09-AF60-82B7ADBF44B2 DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250117T150000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250117T160000 DESCRIPTION:Sponsored by FAMU-FSU Engineering Department of Electrical & Co mputer Engineering\n\nFriday\, Jan. 17 3:00 p.m.\nRoom 120\, CAPS\n\nThe 2 010 “axioms” of insecurity for commodity software systems explain\nwhy such systems are likely to remain vulnerable for the foreseeable future.\ nRecent reports of security breaches confirm this long-standing trend\, il lustrating\nhigh-value penetrations of both business enterprises and gover nment agencies by\nstate-sponsored adversaries\, originating primarily fro m China and Russia. To counter penetrations\nof endpoint systems (e.g.\, l aptops\, desktops\, mobile phones) and embedded applications (e.g.\,\nener gy distribution subsystems and robotic applications)\, we designed GreenBo x\, a low-cost trustworthy\nsoftware platform that withstands any remote a dversary attack – even when the underlying operating systems\n(e.g.\, Wi ndows\, Linux\, MacOS\, ROS) are fully compromised by zero-day attacks. Gr eenBox never requires security\npatches\, and all its updates are formally specified and verified\; it retains its secure usability on legacy system s and applications\;\nand it is not vulnerable to social engineering attac ks that insert malicious software into the underlying operating system\nan d applications. We argue that the one-time cost of achieving GreenBox’s trustworthiness via formal specification and verification is\nmodest and m uch below the recurrent cost of recovery from typical software breaches.\n \nSpeaker(s): Dr. Virgil Gligor\, \n\nRoom: 120\, Bldg: BLDG A\, 2000 Levy Ave\, Tallahassee\, Florida\, United States\, 32310 LOCATION:Room: 120\, Bldg: BLDG A\, 2000 Levy Ave\, Tallahassee\, Florida\, United States\, 32310 ORGANIZER:ckim@caps.fsu.edu SEQUENCE:9 SUMMARY:GreenBox: A Trustworthy Software Platform for Untrusted and Comprom ised Systems URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/462310 X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p>Sponsored by FAMU-FSU Engineering Departme nt of Electrical &amp\; Computer Engineering</p>\n<p>Friday\, Jan. 17 3:00 p.m.<br>Room 120\, CAPS</p>\n<p>The 2010 &ldquo\;axioms&rdquo\; of insecu rity for commodity software systems explain<br>why such systems are likely to remain vulnerable for the foreseeable future.<br>Recent reports of sec urity breaches confirm this long-standing trend\, illustrating<br>high-val ue penetrations of both business enterprises and government agencies by<br >state-sponsored adversaries\, originating primarily from China and Russia . To counter penetrations<br>of endpoint systems (e.g.\, laptops\, desktop s\, mobile phones) and embedded applications (e.g.\,<br>energy distributio n subsystems and robotic applications)\, we designed GreenBox\, a low-cost trustworthy<br>software platform that withstands any remote adversary att ack &ndash\; even when the underlying operating systems<br>(e.g.\, Windows \, Linux\, MacOS\, ROS) are fully compromised by zero-day attacks. GreenBo x never requires security<br>patches\, and all its updates are formally sp ecified and verified\; it retains its secure usability on legacy systems a nd applications\;<br>and it is not vulnerable to social engineering attack s that insert malicious software into the underlying operating system<br>a nd applications. We argue that the one-time cost of achieving GreenBox&rsq uo\;s trustworthiness via formal specification and verification is<br>mode st and much below the recurrent cost of recovery from typical software bre aches.</p> END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR