BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20250309T030000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20251102T010000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20251013T052441Z UID:92EA71F8-8083-493E-86B6-294FD913E709 DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251022T190000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251022T203000 DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT: Joseph discusses wireless security beginning with WW II enigma code interception and decryption methods along with the heros an d heroines who worked around the clock to save the allied nations. The col d war\, following WWII\, introduced additional risks and new challenges an d\, by example\, wireless security failures\, ease of wireless packet inte rcept\, and a list of encryption methods with inherent security defects. F inally\, wireless risks present in 2025 are shown as security aircraft\, s hip\, automotive\, and military cases aircraft\, drones\, and ship example s. IMSI-catcher is a telephone eavesdropping device used for intercepting mobile phone traffic and tracking location data of mobile phone users. A " fake" base station may be installed in a building\, state police trunk\, o r UAVs and Balloons (!) and targeted cell phones acquired\, tracked\, & lo gged. This mapping and the service provider's real towers is considered a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. However\, sophisticated attacks may be ab le to downgrade 3G and LTE to non-LTE network services - which do not requ ire mutual authentication - and calls intercepted. State-of-the-art 5G Cel lular security technology and the identified risks of base-station's dynam ically changing protocols\, hardware BTS trojans\, and group cellids and l ocation interception challenges are highlighted. Originally presented at a Rutgers IEEE dinner\, a professor commented it would be a sleepless night after hearing the risks outlined!\n\nBIO: Joseph Jesson\, is CEO of RFSi gint Group\, a wireless sensor platform IP and SOC supply-chain advisory c ompany\, Adj ECE Professor at The College of New Jersey\, and currently co nsults with corporations on wireless sensor networks (LPWAN narrowband dig ital technology). Joe has 25+ years of experience in designing and impleme nting - through production - IoT wireless sensors & embedded systems and w as awarded General Electric's Innovation prize\, the Edison Award\, in 200 7. Joe was awarded over 15 patents\, published in the IEEE IoT Journal\, a nd engineered and tested wireless TEMPEST-shielded secure systems. Current ly IEEE Princeton LIFE Affinity Group Chair.\n\nCo-sponsored by: MIT Alumn i\n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/507015 LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/507015 ORGANIZER:jejesson4@gmail.com SEQUENCE:9 SUMMARY:From Enigma to Now: A Journey Through Wireless Security URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/507015 X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><span style="font- family: 'times new roman'\, times\, serif\; font-size: 14pt\;">ABSTRACT:</ span>&nbsp\;</strong> <span style="font-family: 'times new roman'\, times\ , serif\; font-size: 14pt\;">Joseph discusses wireless security beginning with WWII enigma code interception and decryption methods along with the h eros and heroines who worked around the clock to save the allied nations. The cold war\, following WWII\, introduced additional risks and new challe nges and\, by example\, wireless security failures\, ease of wireless pack et intercept\, and a list of encryption methods with inherent security def ects. Finally\, wireless risks present in 2025 are shown as security aircr aft\, ship\, automotive\, and military cases aircraft\, drones\, and ship examples.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;IMSI-catcher is a telephone eavesdropping device us ed for intercepting mobile phone traffic and tracking location data of mob ile phone users. A "fake" base station may be installed in a building\, st ate police trunk\, or UAVs and Balloons (!) and targeted cell phones acqui red\, tracked\, &amp\; logged. This mapping&nbsp\; and the service provide r's real towers is considered a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.&nbsp\; Ho wever\, sophisticated attacks may be able to downgrade 3G and LTE to non-L TE network services - which do not require mutual authentication - and cal ls intercepted.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;State-of-the-art 5G Cellular security technol ogy and the identified risks of base-station's dynamically changing protoc ols\, hardware BTS trojans\, and group cellids and location interception c hallenges are highlighted. Originally presented at a Rutgers IEEE dinner\, a professor commented it would be a sleepless night after hearing the ris ks outlined!&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</span></p>\n<p>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><span style="fon t-family: arial\, sans-serif\; font-size: large\;"><strong><span style="fo nt-family: 'times new roman'\, times\, serif\;">BIO:</span>&nbsp\;</strong >&nbsp\;<span style="font-family: 'times new roman'\, times\, serif\;">Jos eph Jesson\, is CEO of RFSigint Group\, a wireless sensor platform IP and SOC supply-chain advisory company\, Adj ECE Professor at The College of Ne w Jersey\, and currently consults with corporations on wireless sensor net works (LPWAN narrowband digital technology). Joe has 25+ years of experien ce in designing and implementing - through production - IoT wireless senso rs &amp\; embedded systems and was awarded General Electric's Innovation p rize\, the Edison Award\, in 2007. Joe was awarded over 15 patents\, publi shed in the IEEE IoT Journal\, and engineered and tested wireless TEMPEST- shielded secure systems. Currently IEEE Princeton LIFE Affinity Group Chai r.</span><span style="color: #000000\;"><br></span></span></p> END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR