BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20260329T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:BST
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20251026T010000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=10
TZNAME:GMT
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260325T140926Z
UID:1729E7B7-EEDD-4541-892C-B662F83E8211
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260326T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260326T180000
DESCRIPTION:With the growth of hyperscale computing and commensurate new la
 rge data center loads as well as increasing electrification\, the price of
  energy is now an important factor in load-side investment decisions. Both
  the spot price as well as risk-trades (via contracting) can mitigate and 
 manage price risk. However\, incomplete markets in risk mean that modeling
  market outcomes requires solving computationally intensive equilibrium pr
 oblems that may have multiple equilibria. We extend a method to reduce bil
 inear terms in a risk-averse general equilibrium problem to include flexib
 le and endogenous demand as well as various forms of contracts including s
 waps and options. We use an exact rather than algorithmic approach and are
  thus able to make robust claims about the range of market equilibria in t
 erms of reliability\, emissions\, and social welfare. Through case studies
  based on the New England and ERCOT systems\, we find that including the r
 isk appetite and flexibility of consumers can radically alter investment d
 ecisions. This work has implications for incorporating new large loads as 
 an active market participant rather than treating them as an exogenous\, i
 nelastic parameter. We demonstrate that when exposed to market signals\, n
 ew demand is not inherently harmful to reliability or average prices in th
 e long-run so long as sufficient new supply can be connected. Price caps c
 an lead to lower supply and demand investment\, while hedging arrangements
  can better protect existing consumers.\n\nSpeaker(s): Conleigh Byers\n\nR
 oom: 909B\, Bldg: Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering\, Im
 perial College London\, South Kensington Campus\, London\, England\, Unite
 d Kingdom\, SW7 2AZ\, Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/549490
LOCATION:Room: 909B\, Bldg: Department of Electrical and Electronic Enginee
 ring\, Imperial College London\, South Kensington Campus\, London\, Englan
 d\, United Kingdom\, SW7 2AZ\, Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/5
 49490
ORGANIZER:ignacio.serrano23@imperial.ac.uk
SEQUENCE:73
SUMMARY:Electricity Market Design and Risk Trading with Flexible and Endoge
 nous Demand
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/549490
X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p><img src="https://events.vtools.ieee.org/v
 tools_ui/media/display/0050d0ff-5ab9-4b52-9c30-66f4a7b92ec4" width="1015" 
 height="541"><br>With the growth of hyperscale computing and commensurate 
 new large data center loads as well as increasing electrification\, the pr
 ice of energy is now an important factor in load-side investment decisions
 . Both the spot price as well as risk-trades (via contracting) can mitigat
 e and manage price risk. However\, incomplete markets in risk mean that mo
 deling market outcomes requires solving computationally intensive equilibr
 ium problems that may have multiple equilibria. We extend a method to redu
 ce bilinear terms in a risk-averse general equilibrium problem to include 
 flexible and endogenous demand as well as various forms of contracts inclu
 ding swaps and options. We use an exact rather than algorithmic approach a
 nd are thus able to make robust claims about the range of market equilibri
 a in terms of reliability\, emissions\, and social welfare. Through case s
 tudies based on the New England and ERCOT systems\, we find that including
  the risk appetite and flexibility of consumers can radically alter invest
 ment decisions. This work has implications for incorporating new large loa
 ds as an active market participant rather than treating them as an exogeno
 us\, inelastic parameter. We demonstrate that when exposed to market signa
 ls\, new demand is not inherently harmful to reliability or average prices
  in the long-run so long as sufficient new supply can be connected. Price 
 caps can lead to lower supply and demand investment\, while hedging arrang
 ements can better protect existing consumers.</p>
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR