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DTSTART:20260308T030000
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DTSTAMP:20260412T224509Z
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260411T110000
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DESCRIPTION:Intentional spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GN
 SS) signals has become a pervasive threat\, particularly in conflict regio
 ns. This talk will present spoofing detection and mitigation techniques le
 veraging Doppler-frequency characteristics and IMU sensors. In spoofing sc
 enarios where authentic and spoofing signals coexist\, it is challenging t
 o distinguish the authentic signals across all channels. To address this\,
  this talk will introduce the Receiver Motion-Induced Doppler Frequency Di
 fference (RMIDFD)\, designed to eliminate the effects of receiver clock dr
 ift-induced Doppler shifts and satellite movement-induced Doppler shifts\,
  retaining only the motion-induced Doppler components. The RMIDFD thus pre
 serves only the kinematic signature associated with either the authentic o
 r the spoofed trajectory. Whenever the legitimate receiver trajectory and 
 the spoofed trajectory exhibit distinct motion\, the GNSS signals correspo
 nding to each can be effectively discriminated. The true movement type of 
 the receiver is obtained with the assistance of an IMU sensor through a ne
 ural network. In addition\, it supports the effective recovery of position
  in the presence of spoofing attacks. Simulations demonstrate the detectio
 n and mitigation process and validate the corrected positioning results in
  a Digital Twin platform. The proposed algorithm is further implemented in
  a GNSS software-defined radio (SDR) testbed and the hardware experiments 
 confirm the successful spoofing detection and mitigation.\n\nSpeaker(s): G
 enshe Chen\, \n\nRoom: 401-G Conference Room\, Bldg: Martin Luther King Jr
 . Memorial Library\, 901 G St NW\, Washington\, District of Columbia\, Uni
 ted States\, 20001\, Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/553854
LOCATION:Room: 401-G Conference Room\, Bldg: Martin Luther King Jr. Memoria
 l Library\, 901 G St NW\, Washington\, District of Columbia\, United State
 s\, 20001\, Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/553854
ORGANIZER:arcjai7@gmail.com
SEQUENCE:12
SUMMARY:GNSS Spoofing Detection and Mitigation Based on Receiver Motion-Ind
 uced Doppler
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/553854
X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><div class="elementToProof">Intentional spoof
 ing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals has become a per
 vasive threat\, particularly in conflict regions. This talk will present s
 poofing detection and mitigation techniques leveraging Doppler-frequency c
 haracteristics and IMU sensors. In spoofing scenarios where authentic and 
 spoofing signals coexist\, it is challenging to distinguish the authentic 
 signals across all channels. To address this\, this talk will introduce th
 e Receiver Motion-Induced Doppler Frequency Difference (RMIDFD)\, designed
  to eliminate the effects of receiver clock drift-induced Doppler shifts a
 nd satellite movement-induced Doppler shifts\, retaining only the motion-i
 nduced Doppler components. The RMIDFD thus preserves only the kinematic si
 gnature associated with either the authentic or the spoofed trajectory. Wh
 enever the legitimate receiver trajectory and the spoofed trajectory exhib
 it distinct motion\, the GNSS signals corresponding to each can be effecti
 vely discriminated.&nbsp\; The true movement type of the receiver is obtai
 ned with the assistance of an IMU sensor through a neural network.&nbsp\; 
 In addition\, it supports the effective recovery of position in the presen
 ce of spoofing attacks. Simulations demonstrate the detection and mitigati
 on process and validate the corrected positioning results in a Digital Twi
 n platform. The proposed algorithm is further implemented in a GNSS softwa
 re-defined radio (SDR) testbed and the hardware experiments confirm the su
 ccessful spoofing detection and mitigation.</div>
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