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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260727T144500
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DESCRIPTION:Title: Hardware Implementation of a Stealthy and Lightweight Ba
 ckdoor for CRYSTALS-Kyber in Hybrid Cryptosystems\n\nSpeaker: Dr. Debapriy
 a Basu Roy\, Assistant Professor\n\nDepartment of Computer Science and Eng
 ineering\nIndian Institute of Technology Kanpur\n\nDate and time: Monday\,
  July 27\, 2026\, 2:45-3:45 PM\nLocation: George Mason University\, Engine
 ering Building room: ENGR 3507\n\nAbstract: The threat of practical quantu
 m attacks has catapulted viable alternatives\, like Post-Quantum Cryptogra
 phy (PQC)\, into prominence. The adoption and integration of standardized 
 PQC primitives across the entire digital stack are promoted by various sta
 ndardization bodies\, governments\, and major corporate houses. A serious 
 challenge in quantum migration is ensuring that there is no hidden backdoo
 r in the PQC implementations of a hybrid cryptosystem (supporting both pre
 -quantum and post-quantum algorithms)\, which are often procured from a th
 ird-party vendor. In this presentation\, we investigate the possibility of
  a Kleptographic backdoor on the\n\nNIST-recommended key-encapsulation mec
 hanism CRYSTALS-Kyber. The modified Kyber Key-Generation algorithm achieve
 s an indistinguishable decryption failure probability that is indistinguis
 hable from that of the original CRYSTALS-Kyber. The Kleptographic module i
 s also implemented in an FPGA and embedded in the CRYSTALS-Kyber accelerat
 or\, with a very low area overhead (283 LUTs or 2% of total area). It can 
 thus easily pass performance and functionality tests.\n\nRoom: 3507\, Bldg
 : Engineering Building\, George Mason University\, 4511 Patriot Cir\, Fair
 fax\, VA 22030\, Fairfax\, Virginia\, United States\, 22030
LOCATION:Room: 3507\, Bldg: Engineering Building\, George Mason University\
 , 4511 Patriot Cir\, Fairfax\, VA 22030\, Fairfax\, Virginia\, United Stat
 es\, 22030
ORGANIZER:kafi@ieee.org
SEQUENCE:33
SUMMARY:Hardware Implementation of a Stealthy and Lightweight Backdoor for 
 CRYSTALS-Kyber in Hybrid Cryptosystems
URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/569347
X-ALT-DESC:Description: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x
 _elementToProof&quot;&gt;&lt;strong data-olk-copy-source=&quot;MessageBody&quot;&gt;Title: Hardwar
 e Implementation of a Stealthy and Lightweight Backdoor for CRYSTALS-Kyber
  in Hybrid Cryptosystems&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToPr
 oof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Speaker:&lt;/strong&gt;&amp;nbsp\; Dr. 
 Debapriya Basu Roy\, Assistant Professor&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elem
 entToProof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\
 ; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; Department of Computer Science and Engin
 eering&amp;nbsp\;&lt;br&gt;&amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;nbsp\; &amp;
 nbsp\; Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_
 elementToProof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Date and time:&lt;/st
 rong&gt; Monday\, July 27\, 2026\, 2:45-3:45 PM&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementT
 oProof&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Location:&amp;nbsp\; &lt;/strong&gt;George Mason University\, Engine
 ering Building room: ENGR 3507&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp\
 ;&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToPr
 oof&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Abstract:&lt;/strong&gt;&amp;nbsp\;The threat of practical quantum atta
 cks has catapulted&amp;nbsp\;viable&amp;nbsp\;alternatives\, like Post-Quantum Cry
 ptography (PQC)\, into prominence. The adoption and integration of standar
 dized PQC primitives across the entire digital stack are promoted by vario
 us standardization bodies\, governments\, and major corporate houses. A se
 rious challenge in quantum migration is ensuring that there is no hidden b
 ackdoor in the PQC implementations of a hybrid cryptosystem (supporting bo
 th pre-quantum and post-quantum algorithms)\, which are often&amp;nbsp\;procur
 ed&amp;nbsp\;from a third-party vendor. In this presentation\, we investigate 
 the possibility of a Kleptographic backdoor on the&amp;nbsp\;&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;
 div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;\n&lt;div class=&quot;x_elementToProof&quot;&gt;NIST-recommen
 ded key-encapsulation mechanism CRYSTALS-Kyber. The modified Kyber Key-Gen
 eration algorithm achieves an indistinguishable decryption failure probabi
 lity that is indistinguishable from that of the original CRYSTALS-Kyber. T
 he Kleptographic module is also implemented in an FPGA and embedded in the
  CRYSTALS-Kyber accelerator\, with a very low area overhead (283 LUTs or 2
 % of total area). It can thus easily pass performance and functionality te
 sts.&lt;/div&gt;\n&lt;/div&gt;
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