BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:IEEE vTools.Events//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/New_York BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20270314T030000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=2SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:EDT END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:20261101T010000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0400 TZOFFSETTO:-0500 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=11 TZNAME:EST END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261107T061618Z UID:1B40B9AB-5E94-476B-9818-C95BBEDFA467 DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261126T140000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261126T150000 DESCRIPTION:Every time an autonomous vehicle (AV) trusts a message from ano ther car\, a traffic signal or its manufacturer's server\, it is really tr usting classical security mechanism (e.g.\, public-key cryptography)\, and that trust may have an expiry date. A powerful enough quantum computer co uld break the RSA and elliptic-curve schemes that sign vehicle-to-everythi ng (V2X) safety messages and software updates\, and weaken the symmetric k eys that protect stored data. Cars sold today will likely still be on the road if that day comes\, and anything an attacker records now could be dec rypted later. So the real question is not whether to prepare\, but how. We will walk through what quantum computing actually puts at risk in an AV\, which defences look most promising (post-quantum cryptography\, quantum k ey distribution and hybrid approaches)\, and why getting them into real ca rs is harder than it sounds. We will close with an industry example\, a fe w open research problems and a practical roadmap for the transition.\n\nSp eaker(s): Moniruzzaman\, \n\nVirtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/591 986 LOCATION:Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/591986 ORGANIZER:ajmery.sultana@algomau.ca SEQUENCE:34 SUMMARY:Securing Autonomous Vehicles for the Quantum Era: Threats\, Quantum -Safe Solutions\, and Deployment Challenges URL;VALUE=URI:https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/591986 X-ALT-DESC:Description: <br /><p><span style="background-color: transparent \;">Every time an autonomous vehicle (AV) trusts a message from another ca r\, a traffic signal or its manufacturer's server\, it is really trusting classical security </span>mechanism<span style="background-color: transpar ent\;"> (e.g.\, public-key cryptography)\, and that trust may have an expi ry date. A powerful enough quantum computer could break the RSA and ellipt ic-curve schemes that sign vehicle-to-everything (V2X) safety messages and software updates\, and weaken the symmetric keys that protect stored data . Cars sold today will likely still be on the road if that day comes\, and anything an attacker records now could be decrypted later. So the real qu estion is not whether to prepare\, but how. We will</span><span style="bac kground-color: transparent\;">&nbsp\;walk through what quantum computing a ctually puts at risk in an AV\, which defences look most promising (post-q uantum cryptography\, quantum key distribution and hybrid approaches)\, an d why getting them into real cars is harder than it sounds.&nbsp\; We will close with an industry example\, a few open research problems and a pract ical roadmap for the transition.</span></p> END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR