QoS Throttling to Elicit User Cooperation in Computer Systems

#QoS #Throttling #to #Elicit #User #Cooperation #in #Computer #Systems #by #Dr. #Kevin #A. #Kwiat #U.S. #Air #Force #Research #Laboratory #Rome #NY
Share

QoS Throttling to Elicit User Cooperation in Computer Systems by Dr. Kevin A. Kwiat, U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, NY



  Date and Time

  Location

  Hosts

  Registration



  • Add_To_Calendar_icon Add Event to Calendar
  • New Jersey Institute of Technology
  • Newark, New Jersey
  • United States 07102
  • Building: Electrical and Computer Engineering
  • Room Number: 202
  • Click here for Map

  • Contact Event Host
  • For more information contact: Hong Zhao (201)-8894677, zhao@fdu.edu; or Nirwan Ansari, nirwan.ansari@njit.edu.

    Check http://web.njit.edu/~ieeenj/comm.html for latest updates. Directions to NJIT can be found at: http://www.njit.edu/about/visit/gettingtonjit.php.

  • Starts 25 March 2015 10:45 PM UTC
  • Ends 08 April 2015 02:45 PM UTC
  • No Admission Charge


  Speakers

Dr. Kevin A. Kwiat Dr. Kevin A. Kwiat of U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, NY

Topic:

QoS Throttling to Elicit User Cooperation in Computer Systems

While there exist strong security concepts and mechanisms, implementation and enforcement of these security measures is a critical concern in the security domain. Normal users, un-aware of the implications of their actions, often attempt to bypass or relax the security mechanisms in place, seeking instead increased performance or ease of use. Thus, the human in the loop becomes the weakest link. This shortcoming adds a level of uncertainty unacceptable in highly critical information systems. Merely educating the user to adopt safe security practices is limited in its effectiveness; there is a need to implement a technically sound measure to address the weak human factor across a broad spectrum of systems. In this talk, we present a game theoretic model to elicit user cooperation with the security mechanisms in a system. We argue for a change in the design methodology, where users are persuaded to cooperate with the security mechanisms after suitable feedback. Users are offered incentives in the form of increased Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of application and system level performance increase. Users’ motives and their actions are modeled in a game framework using the class of generalized pursuit-evasion differential games.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited: 88ABW-2008-1165

Biography:

Kevin A. Kwiat is a Principal Computer Engineer with the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) in Rome, New York where he has worked for over 31 years. He is currently assigned to the Cyber Assurance Branch. He received the BS in Computer Science and the BA in Mathematics from Utica College of Syracuse University, and the MS in Computer Engineering and the Ph.D. in Computer Engineering from Syracuse University. He holds 4 patents. In addition to his duties with the Air Force, he is an adjunct professor of Computer Science at the State University of New York at Utica/Rome, an adjunct instructor of Computer Engineering at Syracuse University, and a Research Associate Professor with the University at Buffalo. He is an advisor for the National Research Council. He has been recognized by the AFRL Information Directorate with awards for best paper, excellence in technology teaming, and for outstanding individual basic research. His main research interest is dependable computer design. 

Address:United States





Agenda

About the Talk 

While there exist strong security concepts and mechanisms, implementation and enforcement of these security measures is a critical concern in the security domain. Normal users, un-aware of the implications of their actions, often attempt to bypass or relax the security mechanisms in place, seeking instead increased performance or ease of use. Thus, the human in the loop becomes the weakest link. This shortcoming adds a level of uncertainty unacceptable in highly critical information systems. Merely educating the user to adopt safe security practices is limited in its effectiveness; there is a need to implement a technically sound measure to address the weak human factor across a broad spectrum of systems. In this talk, we present a game theoretic model to elicit user cooperation with the security mechanisms in a system. We argue for a change in the design methodology, where users are persuaded to cooperate with the security mechanisms after suitable feedback. Users are offered incentives in the form of increased Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of application and system level performance increase. Users’ motives and their actions are modeled in a game framework using the class of generalized pursuit-evasion differential games.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited: 88ABW-2008-1165