Protecting the US Infrastructure from Attacks via Electromagnetic Emissions from Devices (EED)
Technical meeting by invited speaker Timothy Cash. This meeting will be held at the National Historical Electronics Museum in Pioneer Hall from 11:30 to 13:00.
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- Date: 21 Dec 2016
- Time: 11:00 AM to 01:00 PM
- All times are (GMT-05:00) US/Eastern
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- 1745 W. Nursery Road
- Linthicum, Maryland
- United States 21090
- Building: National Historical Electronics Museum
- Room Number: Pioneer Hall
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- Co-sponsored by EMC27
Speakers
Timothy Cash
Protecting the US Infrastructure from Attacks via Electromagnetic Emissions from Devices (EED)
There exists an emerging class of cyber-attacks that penetrate systems by way of the tiny electromagnetic fields given off by technology which we refer to as “Electromagnetic Emissions from Devices (EED)”. Much of today’s technology creates an unintended electromagnetic footprint that is unseen, yet readable, electromagnetic spillage at multiple frequencies. EED can be turned against us as a penetration vector or as a method of data extraction. This, in turn creates multiple threat vectors for different types of intrusion technologies.
EED, otherwise known as attacks across an “air gap” is currently the least used method of intrusion, but represents an area of growing risk that must be managed to protect our cyber infrastructure, especially EED as a unique threat to the US electrical grid. While messages and data on the network may be encrypted, the same data emanated from within the IT infrastructure produced by and between internal components and sub systems produces EED which is not encrypted. This is often seen at the CPU or by the Monitor which produces unencrypted emissions while processing “data in use”. It is this “data in use window” that increases the risk via EED.
EED can be used to bypass passwords or biometrics, gain access to passwords, bypass firewalls, penetrate into networks, to extract data and penetrate sensors on Internet of Things (IOT) networks. EED intrusion penetration/data extraction can occur via multiple threat vectors:
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EED penetrations and data extraction via exposed landline networks
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EED penetrations via power system’s inter-connection into adjacent networks
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EED penetration inside firewalled network enclaves bypassing external firewalls or other network protection and detection
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EED penetration within Network Operations Centers/ Data Centers either via EED readers or across machine to machine inter-connections into other networks
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EED penetrations of user hardware at unencrypted points such as the CPU or monitor
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EED penetration of Internet of Things (IOT) Networks at sensor points or exposed landline inter-connection points
The good news is that the EED threat vector is relatively easy to defeat through application of both technical and non-technical means. The even better news is that we have an opportunity to get ahead of the hackers and nation state actors, but only if we act now to include anti-EED intrusion protection technologies as part of our Nation Cyber Security Strategy. This abstract’s technical solution will relate best to securing the emerging national smart infrastructure: Internet of Things as well as the US electrical grid.
Timothy Cash John W. Link
EMC Society VOLVOX Inc.
cash.tim@gmail.com johnwlink@hotmail.com
Email:
EMC Society
Protecting the US Infrastructure from Attacks via Electromagnetic Emissions from Devices (EED)
Biography:
Email:
VOLVOX Inc
Protecting the US Infrastructure from Attacks via Electromagnetic Emissions from Devices (EED)
Biography:
Agenda
11:30 - 12:00 - Lunch and light refreshments
12:00 - 12:45 - Presentation
12:45 - 13:00 - Questions
Note: Parking will be available in the lot at the end of the build. The parking lot in front of the museum will be shut down on the 21st for construction. Sorry about the inconvience.