Near-Field Integrated Magnetic Sensing System for Hardware Security

Share

Abstract: Hardware Trojan or spyware circuits operating as hardware backdoors can be implemented and integrated into computer chips, smart-cards, and other crypto processors. Hardware Trojan circuits inside a chip is generally harmless in normal operation until they get triggered by a preset internal or external signal to steal data or override and even control the system. Detection of hardware Trojans is very difficult as they are normally in nano-scale sizes and integrated into ICs with high complexity system inside and a huge number of gates. Therefore, Trojan inspection through destructive reverse engineering may not ensure the absence of hardware Trojans. In this talk, I present a demonstration to non-invasively detect hardware Trojan, analyze and identify vulnerable portions of cryptographic chips based on magnetic sensing towards cybersecurity applications.

Speaker Biography: Dr. Mai-Khanh is currently is an assistant professor at VLSI Design and Education Center (VDEC), the University of Tokyo, Japan. He received the Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering and Information Systems, The University of Tokyo, Japan in 2011. He was a lecturer of Faculty of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Technology, National University, Vietnam from 2006 to 2013. Dr. Mai-Khanh worked as a post-doctoral researcher in from 2011 to 2013 in VDEC. His research interests include integrated RF/mm-Wave circuits, and magnetic sensing. He is a recipient of Best Paper Awards of the Asian Symposium on Quality Electronic Design Symp. in 2010, the third rank of the 9th IEEE NEWCAS 2011, and of IEEE NEWCAS 2017. He servered as a TPC chair of Vietnam-Japan Science and Technology Symp. 2019, The First Int’l Workshop on Hardware Oriented Cybersecurity 2018, and Vietnam-­Japan Scientific Exchange Meeting 2017 and also a TPC member of Intl. Conf. on Integrated Circuits, Design, and Verification 2017.



  Date and Time

  Location

  Contact

  Registration



  • 85 5th Street NW
  • TSRB 509
  • Atlanta, Georgia
  • United States 30308
  • Co-sponsored by Professor Hua Wang


  Speakers

Professor Mai-Khanh N. Nguyen

Topic:

Near-Field Integrated Magnetic Sensing System for Hardware Security

Abstract: Hardware Trojan or spyware circuits operating as hardware backdoors can be implemented and integrated into computer chips, smart-cards, and other crypto processors. Hardware Trojan circuits inside a chip is generally harmless in normal operation until they get triggered by a preset internal or external signal to steal data or override and even control the system. Detection of hardware Trojans is very difficult as they are normally in nano-scale sizes and integrated into ICs with high complexity system inside and a huge number of gates. Therefore, Trojan inspection through destructive reverse engineering may not ensure the absence of hardware Trojans. In this talk, I present a demonstration to non-invasively detect hardware Trojan, analyze and identify vulnerable portions of cryptographic chips based on magnetic sensing towards cybersecurity applications.

Biography:

Speaker Biography: Dr. Mai-Khanh is currently is an assistant professor at VLSI Design and Education Center (VDEC), the University of Tokyo, Japan. He received the Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering and Information Systems, The University of Tokyo, Japan in 2011. He was a lecturer of Faculty of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Technology, National University, Vietnam from 2006 to 2013. Dr. Mai-Khanh worked as a post-doctoral researcher in from 2011 to 2013 in VDEC. His research interests include integrated RF/mm-Wave circuits, and magnetic sensing. He is a recipient of Best Paper Awards of the Asian Symposium on Quality Electronic Design Symp. in 2010, the third rank of the 9th IEEE NEWCAS 2011, and of IEEE NEWCAS 2017. He servered as a TPC chair of Vietnam-Japan Science and Technology Symp. 2019, The First Int’l Workshop on Hardware Oriented Cybersecurity 2018, and Vietnam-­Japan Scientific Exchange Meeting 2017 and also a TPC member of Intl. Conf. on Integrated Circuits, Design, and Verification 2017.

Email: